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Consumers often rely on an expert’s diagnosis to assess their needs. If the expert
is also the seller of services, he may use his informational advantage to induce
overtreatment, which is a pervasive phenomenon in experts markets. We offer
and discuss conditions leading to equilibrium overtreatment in an otherwise
purely competitive model. This market failure results from consumers’ ability
to turn down an expert’s recommendation: experts defraud consumers to keep
them uninformed, as this deters them from seeking a better price elsewhere.
1. Introduction
Economists often assume that consumers know which goods or services
they want. In fact, in many situations consumers have to rely on an
expert’s advice to assess their needs. Examples include all sorts of
repairs (car repairs, plumbing), health care, legal and tax services; firms
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face the same difficulty when choosing computers and software. The
informational advantage of an expert suggests that he may have an
incentive to make false recommendations, especially if he is also the
seller of the services. Emons (1997) cites a Swiss study showing that
the average population had 33% more of seven important surgical
interventions than physicians and their families. In the late 1970s
the Department of Transportation estimated that 53% of auto repair
charges represented unnecessary repairs (see Wolinsky, 1993). Together
with anecdotal evidence,1 these observations indicate that we need a
better understanding of fraud and inefficient overtreatment in experts
markets. Is overtreatment associated with a fundamental market failure?
Which mechanism may explain its stability, in spite of competition? And
what is its impact on market organization and on welfare?
The impact of competition on overtreatment has been much de-
bated in health economics. In that literature,2 the physician’s market
power over the consumer is a central factor behind the overtreatment
phenomenon (also known as the supplier-induced demand hypothesis).
The moral hazard arising from the consumer’s insurance coverage is
believed to exacerbate the problem. However, fraud may well play a
role even in the absence of insurance and market power. In this paper,
we propose a simple model with risk-neutral, uninsured consumers to
investigate whether a competitive experts market performs efficiently.
We identify a set of conditions under which the market involves equi-
librium fraud and overtreatment.
The following reasoning shows how competition may in fact favor
inefficient overtreatment. The key problem in experts markets is that the
consumer knows that there is a loss, but only an expert can determine
which treatment is needed. Moreover, once the loss is fixed there is no
evidence in favor of one treatment or another. Taken together, these
features define a credence good, a term coined by Darby and Karni
(1973). Because there typically exist some economies of scope between
diagnosis and treatment,3 it is costly for the consumer to get a second
opinion. The expert thus enjoys an important strategic advantage over
the consumer. Note, however, that these features do not create per se
1. See, for instance, “The Mechanic from Hell” in the New York Times, August 4, 1996.
2. McGuire (2000) offers a survey of both theoretical and empirical results, supporting
the hypothesis that physicians induce consumers to utilize more health care than they
would have chosen if well informed.
3. These may derive from several sources. Performing a diagnosis may require strip-
ping down an engine, thus transferring some of the repair costs to the diagnosis stage. Once
the diagnosis is obtained, asking a second expert to repair the loss may involve additional
transportation costs; in the health care case, changing doctors may represent losing trust
capital developed with the first physician. Finally, it may be difficult to transmit precise
information about a diagnosis to another party.
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any incentive to induce overtreatment. They simply make overcharging
more likely: upon making the diagnosis the expert may increase the
price without fearing that the customer rejects his offer.4
To avoid such a hold-up problem, consumers often ask for a
commitment to prices. In practice, experts commit to a tariff, including
prices for different inputs such as spare parts, drugs, or labor. Once
the diagnosis is made, the expert provides a bill listing the inputs
that he claims are needed for the repair, and computes the repair
price accordingly. This system requires the expert to justify the use of
additional inputs to increase the repair price. Still, it does not create
overtreatment: if the customer cannot observe whether these inputs
were actually used or not, the expert will not have to use them. The
expert thus defrauds the customer because he makes false claims about
inputs used, but overtreatment does not appear.
Suppose now that the customer is able to verify which inputs were
actually used. The expert then has to incur an additional “fraud cost”
when he lies about the needed treatment, equal to the cost of unnecessary
but verifiable inputs. Now, lying increases the price, but also increases
the repair cost. Thus an interesting effect appears: avoiding fraud and
overtreatment requires the expert to reduce the difference between
repair prices (in the limit, if the prices do not differ at all, there is no
fraud incentive); in other words, cheap “minor” repairs must subsidize
expensive, “major” ones. But such cross subsidies are difficult to sustain
if the customer is allowed to turn down an expert’s offer of a minor repair
to find a better price elsewhere. It may therefore well be that competition,
and in particular more competition on minor repairs through cream-
skimming, favors fraud and overtreatment.
In order to test these intuitions, we set up a model with the follow-
ing key elements: informational advantage for the expert, economies of
scope between diagnosis and repair, commitment to prices, verifiability
of some inputs by the customer (fraud cost), opportunistic customers,
and competition on minor repairs. The model is inspired by Wolinsky
(1993). This is a simple framework in which the loss may require either a
minor or a major repair. Experts compete in tariffs, which include repair
prices and a price for the diagnosis. The model incorporates an optimal
search by the customer among experts. Compared to the literature, we
innovate by taking into account the fraud cost originating in the use of
unnecessary inputs when an expert imitates a major repair. We also allow
for a varying strength of competition on minor repairs, by introducing
an outside agent who offers to fix minor losses at a given price.
4. In the literature this hold-up problem is associated with the work of Diamond (1971),
who considers an exogenous cost of switching from one seller to another; it may be so
severe to make the monopoly price prevail as the unique equilibrium price.
856 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
We first analyze Perfect Bayesian Equilibria when this outside
agent offers competitive prices. Equilibria without fraud can be clas-
sified into two types. When both economies of scope and the fraud cost
are high enough, there exists an efficient equilibrium in which the first
visited expert is truthful and fixes the loss. Each repair price is set close
enough to marginal cost to deter cream-skimming, without inducing
fraud. Otherwise, when the fraud cost is high relative to economies of
scope we show, as in Wolinsky (1993), the existence of a “specialization
equilibrium” without fraud. Here, the first visited expert is truthful
because the customer rejects his offer of an expensive repair, and gets
the loss fixed by another expert. Because the first visited expert only
performs minor repairs, he is a “minor specialist” (the outside agent is
in fact such a minor specialist). Specialization is inefficient because the
diagnosis cost is sometimes incurred twice.
Finally, when the fraud cost is small relative to the economies of
scope (and the external agent offers competitive prices), we devise a
pure-strategy equilibrium in which experts claim that a costly repair
is needed regardless of the customer’s true needs. Thus the consumer
does not learn anything and accepts to pay a high repair price, despite
knowing that with some probability unnecessary inputs are used; fraud
and overtreatment happen in equilibrium. Our theory thus relates fraud
and overtreatment to information transmission and cream-skimming:
the expert pools information in order to deter the consumer from seeking
a better price elsewhere.
By contrast, if the outside agent is removed so that competition
on minor repairs is reduced, there exist multiple equilibria. The fraud
and specialization equilibria introduced above are still equilibria, for
the same parameter values. However, now there always exist equilibria
without fraud. More competition on minor repairs, represented by the
introduction of an outside agent, indeed favors fraud by making it the
only possible equilibrium outcome for some parameter values.
Previous papers have looked at two extreme cases. First, some
have assumed that fraud is costless.5 Then lying is not inefficient per
se, and the only source of inefficiency is the cost of getting a second
opinion. By contrast we allow for fraud costs. This allows us to properly
define overtreatment, confirm its empirical relevance since it appears
as an equilibrium phenomenon, and discuss its welfare effects in a
5. Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Wolinsky (1993), Taylor (1995), Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006), and Fong (2005). Sometimes the focus is on other manipulations:
Taylor (1995) adopts a framework where he can analyze inefficiencies arising in the
level of maintenance of the durable good; Emons (1997, 2001) and Fong (2005) allow for
undertreatment; Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), and Emons (2001) analyze potential
inefficiencies in the amount of effort provided by an expert to make a diagnosis; Wolinsky
(1993) allows for diagnosis errors.
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meaningful way because now fraud has a welfare cost.6 In line with the
intuition it turns out that fraud occurs in equilibrium when the fraud
cost is low enough, and the diagnosis cost is high enough to deter the
customer from seeking a second advice. Conversely, a high fraud cost
means that the consumer has full control—it is as if the type of the repair
were verifiable. Then our model shows that equilibria are efficient, thus
confirming the results obtained by a second group of papers, where
repair is verifiable (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Emons, 1997, 2001);
they find no fraudulent overtreatment in equilibrium.
Our model allows for an endogenous diagnosis price, often ne-
glected in the literature.7 Because experts are allowed to reduce the
diagnosis price below its cost, they may redistribute repair profits to
customers. Hence all our equilibria are zero-profit equilibria, contrary to
some equilibria in Wolinsky (1993) and Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
Consequently, the equilibrium diagnosis price is set below the diagnosis
cost, and can sometimes be set to zero, in line with the evidence. We also
verify that customers with minor losses subsidize consumers with major
losses.8
Our model is also relevant for the health economics literature.
This literature typically features a monopolistic competition setup. No
strategic interaction occurs between physicians. Each physician selects
both price and quantity of treatment, taking the reservation utility of
the consumer (defined by other physicians’ prices and quantities) as
given. Overtreatment occurs when the patient would like to consume
less treatment, given the unit price; this is reminiscent of the second-
degree price discrimination literature (see Farley, 1986).
Some papers have subsequently incorporated an asymmetry of
information between the physician and the patient; this enables the
physician to affect the consumer’s incentives to monitor the doctor, or
to end the relationship before treatment. In Dranove (1988) increased
competition leads the physician to set a lower price; this in turn causes
the patient to accept a treatment offer more readily, so that fraud occurs
more often. We also argue that more competition may favor fraud; but
6. Note that the fraud cost is also equal to the social cost of overtreatment. Hence a
higher fraud cost may have ambiguous effects on total welfare, because on the one hand
it makes fraud less likely due to better monitoring, whereas on the other hand it increases
its social cost when fraud indeed happens in equilibrium. Caution may therefore be called
for when estimating the welfare effects of a policy aiming at deterring fraud.
7. Pitchik and Schotter (1987) take all prices as given. In Wolinsky (1993), Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006), and Fong (2005), the diagnosis price is exogenously set at the
diagnosis cost.
8. In our model these cross subsidies aim at reducing incentives to defraud customers.
There are several other theories for why firms in general choose to resort to cross-subsidies
between goods or services; in particular similar results arise in theories of loss-leader
pricing (see, e.g. Tirole, 1988; Lal and Matutes, 1994).
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our argument relies on the fact that competition renders cross-subsidies
less sustainable. Finally De Jaegher and Jegers (2001) provide a precise
discussion of how the credence good literature may be applied to the
analysis of the supplier-induced demand hypothesis; they also offer a
simple model similar to Pitchik and Schotter (1987) in which prices are
exogenous.
2. The Model
Our model features a consumer (or, equivalently, a continuum of ex
ante identical consumers) and experts. Initially the consumer discovers
a loss that must be repaired: for instance, the car does not work properly,
the house roof leaks, or a tooth aches. The loss may be minor (state m,
probability μ ∈ (0, 1)) or major (state M, probability 1 − μ).9 Whereas an
expert may distinguish between the two states, the consumer cannot.
There are n ≥ 4 identical experts i = 1, . . . , n. An expert may observe
the consumer’s state at a diagnosis cost d ≥ 0. The expert may then repair
the loss, using some inputs at their given prices. The minimum cost to
repair the loss is c
¯
≥ 0 if the loss is minor, and c¯ > c
¯
if the loss is major.
For further use, we define C as the minimum expected cost of getting
the loss fixed by an expert:
C ≡ d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)c¯.
An expert is needed to make a diagnosis and to make a repair. More-
over, we assume that an expert can repair a loss only if he has made
the diagnosis himself. This creates some economies of scope between
diagnosis and repair which are measured by d.10
As is common in the literature, we assume that whether the loss
has been fixed or not is observable by the consumer. In some cases it may
even be verifiable.11 We depart from the rest of the literature by assuming
that some inputs are necessary only for a major repair, and that the use
of some of these “characteristic inputs” is observable. Let f ∈ [0, c¯ − c
¯
]
denote the cost of these inputs. To illustrate, many illnesses may be
9. Using the vocabulary introduced by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), consumers
are homogenous. Dulleck and Kerschbamer also study the case where consumers differ
in the probability distribution over the two states. In Fong (2005) consumers may differ
according to the size of the loss that they incur if the loss is untreated, or in the cost that
would be required to fix the loss; the monopolistic expert then uses fraud in the form of
over-charging as a substitute for price discrimination.
10. Including a switching cost incurred each time a consumer visits an expert would in
fact be equivalent to raising the diagnosis cost by that amount. Hence d can be interpreted
as a diagnosis-and-switching cost.
11. Using the vocabulary introduced by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), verifiability
amounts to “liability.” Wolinsky (1993) assumes verifiability.
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treated either through drugs, or through surgery; the latter (the major
treatment) is clearly observable. In fact, for deontological and practical
reasons the physician must inform the patient and get his consent before
the treatment.
The same features arise in many other cases. A successful major
repair of a firm’s computer system hinges on the compatibility of new
parts with existing devices and usage requirements. The expert would
typically then have to reveal at least some of the inputs that he intends
to use; by contrast this may not be necessary for a minor debugging
operation. Similarly, a household investing in a major house repair
would likely want to choose the attributes, such as colors, location, and
materials of some inputs. Note also that in some countries an expert
is required by law to commit to a tariff, including prices for different
inputs such as spare parts, drugs, or labor. Once the diagnosis is made,
the expert provides a bill listing the inputs that he claims are needed for
the repair, and computes the repair price accordingly.
We therefore adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 1: Prior to using characteristic inputs in a major repair, the
expert must inform the consumer and get his consent.
This assumption can be interpreted as expressing that major re-
pairs are highly complex, and the final selection of inputs depends on
the consumer’s preferences, which are difficult to fully describe ex ante.
The assumption may be too strong for simpler repairs: for instance, a
consumer would probably not care much about which inputs are used
to repair his or her defective DVD player. In Section 5.1, we discuss
the consequences of relaxing Assumption 1, in relation with warranty
contracts and adverse selection.
The key effect of Assumption 1 is that the consumer is able to
identify whether the intended treatment is minor or major, and allows
him to break the relationship should he be able to get a better price
elsewhere for that treatment.12 The consumer’s ability to observe some
inputs that are used only for a major repair also forces the expert to incur
the cost f should he try to charge the consumer for a major repair when in
fact a minor repair would be sufficient. To illustrate, suppose that the roof
leaks and that the rooftop needs to be replaced (the minor intervention).
Suppose also that the roofer (falsely) claims that the rafters are damaged
and need to be changed as well (the major intervention). The consumer
12. A warranty contract whereby the consumer would pay a price upfront against
the expert’s promise to fix the loss would not be feasible. If the expert recommended a
treatment which is offered at a better price elsewhere, the consumer and the expert would
have an incentive to renegotiate. By contrast warranty contracts are feasible in situations
where Assumption 1 does not apply, as will be discussed in Section 5.1.
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may easily observe ex post whether the rafters have been replaced. In
this example f is the cost of replacing the rafters, and it must be added to
the cost of the minor intervention. Thus, f represents a fraud cost for the
expert: the cost of a minor repair increases by f if the expert claims that
the repair is major.13 Whenever the expert defrauds the consumer by
claiming that the loss is major although it is minor, there is overtreatment
because of the overconsumption of inputs, as represented by f . Fraud
and overtreatment therefore go hand in hand throughout the paper.
Finally, an expert cannot claim to make a minor repair if the loss is
major, because the expert would need to use the characteristic inputs to
fix the loss.
These assumptions imply that experts may set two different repair
prices, depending on whether or not characteristic inputs are used. The
tariff of an expert i thus consists of a diagnosis price pi ≥ 0, a repair price
p¯i to be applied whenever the characteristic inputs are used, and a repair
price p
¯ i
to be applied whenever they are not used. The game proceeds
as follows. In the first stage each expert i = 1, . . . , n publicly announces
a tariff (pi , p
¯ i
, p¯i ), to which he is able to commit.14 In the second stage
the customer sequentially visits experts until his loss is repaired. A visit
to an expert i consists of several substages; if in any substage either the
expert rejects the consumer or the consumer rejects the expert’s offer, the
consumer visits another expert. In the first substage the expert accepts
or rejects the customer; if the consumer is accepted he pays the diagnosis
price pi, and the expert observes the state of nature at cost d. In the second
substage the expert either rejects the customer, or offers a price to repair
the loss. If he offers to repair the loss he may choose between price p
¯ iand p¯i if the loss is minor, but he can only offer price p¯i if the loss is
major. Finally the consumer decides whether to reject or accept the offer.
If he accepts the expert fixes the loss, and the repair price offered by the
expert is paid.
Several remarks are noteworthy here. We assume that an expert
may always turn down a customer, either before or after the diagnosis.
Indeed it seems realistic to think that an expert may always invoke
unexpected delays to avoid serving a customer, and will do so if he
expects his profits to be negative. Similarly, the consumer may turn
down the expert’s offer. This enables the consumer to reconsider his
13. Alternatively, one could interpret the positive fraud cost as the expected penalty
associated with being caught by an external auditor, or as a moral cost.
14. The commitment assumption enables us to avoid the hold-up problem mentioned
in the introduction. It is equivalent to assuming that experts may commit to input prices,
and that consumers know which inputs are needed for each type of treatment. As already
observed, repair shops often post their input prices in a place which is visible by the
customers. In some countries this is compulsory.
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choice of expert upon having updated his beliefs about the state. Note
that it also justifies the constraint pi ≥ 0 (otherwise consumers would
visit experts simply to collect a negative diagnosis price).
We focus on pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). The
consumer’s (behavioral) strategy specifies which experts to visit and
the order in which they should be visited, and whether or not to accept
the recommendation of a visited expert, depending on the family of tar-
iffs announced in the first stage of the game, and the recommendations
that he may have received in the past. We assume that experts cannot
observe a consumer’s history. Hence expert i’s strategy includes a tariff
(pi , p
¯ i
, p¯i ), and also a rejection strategy (accept a consumer or not) and a
recommendation strategy (reject, offer the price p
¯ i
, or offer the price p¯i )
which both depend on the observed state of the loss, and on the family
of announced tariffs. A given expert may or may not behave truthfully,
where truthful behavior consists in offering price p
¯ i
if the loss is minor.
Given these strategies, the consumer’s payoff is the benefit derived
from getting the loss fixed minus the sum of all prices paid to the experts
he visits (only the diagnosis price if he turns down the expert’s offer, but
both the diagnosis price and the repair price if he accepts the offer). The
consumer’s expected payoff is computed using the initial beliefs μ, and
the usual Bayesian updating rule, to be applied whenever the consumer
receives an offer. The payoff of an expert equals his revenues, which are
simply the prices paid by consumers who visited him, minus the costs.
The expert’s expected payoff is computed using the actual distribution
of losses among consumers who decide to visit him. This distribution
may differ from the initial distribution (μ, 1 − μ) because the customer
may visit different experts depending on his history.
We impose three tie-breaking rules that are intended to tilt the
balance in favor of more efficient equilibria. First, we assume that if
an expert is indifferent between accepting or rejecting a consumer, he
accepts; similarly, if he is indifferent between offering p
¯ i
or p¯i to a
consumer in state m, he offers p
¯ i
; finally, if a consumer is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting an offer, he accepts it. These tie-breaking
rules allow us to focus on deterministic recommendation and acceptance
strategies. Some inactive players with a suitably chosen tariff may
support an equilibrium. We discard such equilibria by imposing that in
each set of experts with the same recommendation strategy: (i) there is at
least one expert who is visited by the consumer with positive probability
in equilibrium; (ii) experts set the same tariff; (iii) there are at least
two experts.15 Finally, as we mentioned in the introduction, intuition
15. Although (i) indeed discards some equilibria, (ii) and (iii) could be relaxed and are
only introduced to shorten tedious proofs. Condition (ii) is a symmetry requirement, and
(iii) conveys the idea that there are many experts.
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suggests that competition may favor fraud. Therefore, we begin the
analysis by imposing
Assumption 2: There are outside agents who offer the “minor specialist”
tariff (d, c
¯
, c
¯
).
This outside agent repairs minor losses but rejects major losses. A
consumer who knows his state may get the loss fixed at the minimum
cost (note that an outside agent’s behavior and tariffs are given, and that
he cannot make losses anyway). In Section 5.2, we relax this assumption
to study a setup with less competition.
3. Equilibria
As mentioned earlier, our model is close to the one proposed by
Wolinsky (1993), in which equilibria are either efficient, or involve inef-
ficient specialization. We first determine conditions under which these
types of equilibria exist. We then show that a new type of equilibrium
emerges in our setting, namely, equilibria involving costly fraud.
3.1 Efficient Equilibria
Definition 1: An equilibrium is efficient if the first visited expert makes a
truthful recommendation, and the consumer accepts the recommendation.
Supposing that such an efficient equilibrium exists, let us charac-
terize the tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯) of the first visited expert, taking into account
the presence of minor specialists (d, c
¯
, c
¯
). First, it must be that the expert
accepts to repair upon having observed the state:
p
¯
≥ c
¯
and p¯ ≥ c¯.
By assumption the customer accepts both offers. To deter fraud when a
minor loss is diagnosed, the expert’s profits when offering p
¯
must exceed
the profits when offering p¯:
p
¯
− c
¯
≥ p¯ − c
¯
− f.
Finally, by receiving the offer p
¯
the consumer learns that his loss is minor.
Because he may reject this offer to visit a minor specialist instead, in an
efficient equilibrium one must have
p
¯
≤ c
¯
+ d.
Taken together, these inequalities imply
f ≥ c¯ − c
¯
− d ≡ f ∗.
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In the Appendix, we show that f ≥ f ∗ is also a sufficient condition for
an efficient equilibrium to exist.16
Proposition 1: There exists an efficient equilibrium if and only if f ≥
f ∗ = c¯ − c
¯
− d . In any such equilibrium experts make zero expected profits. For
any f ≥ f ∗ the tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯) = (d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ), c¯ − f, c¯) is an equilibrium
tariff.
This result highlights a fundamental tension between, on the one
hand, the incentives to induce the expert to do the repair ( p¯ must
be high enough) and do it efficiently ( p¯ − p
¯
must be small enough to
deter fraud), and, on the other hand, the consumer’s incentive to accept
the offer (p
¯
must be small enough). The last requirement is due to the
consumer’s opportunism, because he may find a better price elsewhere.
We next examine which kinds of inefficiencies may arise when f cannot
sustain an efficient equilibrium.
3.2 Specialization Equilibria
Definition 2: An equilibrium is a specialization equilibrium if the con-
sumer first visits a minor specialist, who makes a truthful recommendation. If
the minor specialist offers to do a minor repair the consumer accepts; otherwise
the consumer visits another expert, whose recommendation to do a major repair
he accepts.
These equilibria formalize the idea that consumers sometimes
resort to a second opinion.17 This phenomenon originates from the fraud
potential, even if it does not occur in equilibrium. For the following
result, which is proved in the Appendix, we define
f ∗∗ = 1 − μ
μ2
[d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
)].
Proposition 2: There exists a specialization equilibrium if and only if f ∈
[f ∗∗, f ∗). For any such f the tariffs (d, c
¯
, c
¯
) (for minor specialists) and (d, c
¯
, c¯)
(for experts repairing only major losses) are equilibrium tariffs. In such an
equilibrium experts make zero expected profits.
16. Other equilibrium tariffs than the one specified in the proposition may exist. We
will discuss general properties of equilibrium tariffs in more detail in Section 4.1.
17. A minor specialist and a consumer in state M would have an incentive to
renegotiate, so as to avoid a costly second visit to an expert. But of course, should such a
renegotiation be allowed and anticipated, a minor specialist would recommend a major
repair in both states. Prohibiting renegotiation, as we do, allows for a stronger competition
on minor repairs. Wolinsky (1993) discusses how minor specialists may commit to repair
only minor losses, for example by not investing in devices used in major repairs.
864 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
A necessary condition for a specialization equilibrium to exist is
that f ∗∗ < f ∗, which requires
d <
μ
1 − μ(1 − μ) (c¯ − c¯).
This condition is intuitive: because specialization involves inefficient
diagnoses, the diagnosis cost must be small enough for equilibrium
specialization. Moreover, the right-hand side is increasing in μ, the prob-
ability that the loss requires a minor repair: the larger is this probability,
the larger is the expected benefit from specialization, which implies
that an inefficient specialization equilibrium may be sustained for larger
values of the diagnosis cost d. Similarly, a larger difference between the
repair costs, c¯ − c
¯
, also implies a larger benefit from specialization.
As long as there are some economies of scope (d > 0) specialization
may mean a costly second visit to an expert for a consumer needing a ma-
jor intervention. As a result, if the diagnosis cost and the probability of a
major intervention were large, the consumer would prefer to get the loss
fixed by one single expert even if that would involve overtreatment: a
relevant threat to the specialization equilibrium is an expert who always
recommends the major intervention. There is therefore a fundamental
trade-off between costly repeated diagnosis and costly overtreatment.
For this reason overtreatment appears as an equilibrium phenomenon
when the fraud cost is not too large, as we show next.
3.3 Fraud Equilibria
Definition 3: An equilibrium is a fraud equilibrium if the first visited
expert always recommends a major intervention, and the consumer accepts the
recommendation.
An expert who always recommends a major treatment has to incur
the fraud cost f whenever the loss is minor. Total repair cost is therefore
C + μf , where the second term measures the inefficiency of a fraud
equilibrium. The proof of the following result is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3: There exists a fraud equilibrium if and only if f < f ∗ and
f ≤ f ∗∗. In such an equilibrium experts make zero expected profits. For any
such f the tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯) = (d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ), c¯, c¯) is an equilibrium tariff.
This result shows that fraudulent overtreatment may appear as an
equilibrium even in a competitive model. The reason is that if experts
offered both interventions at reasonable prices and recommended in-
terventions honestly, they would lose the profitable customers, that is,
those who needed a minor repair. Fraud avoids consumer defection: the
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consumer never learns what type of intervention he really needs. But of
course, it implies an additional expected cost of μf for the consumer.18
In a fraud equilibrium the repair price is high and independent of
the true loss. For a fraud equilibrium to exist the diagnosis cost must
therefore be large enough to discourage the consumer from visiting
a minor specialist first. This is reflected in the condition d > μ(c¯ − c
¯
),
which is necessary for f ∗∗ > 0.
4. Properties of Equilibria
So far, we have determined necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of efficient, specialization, and fraud equilibria.19 The next
proposition states that these are the only type of equilibria that may
exist, implying that fraud and overtreatment must arise as equilibrium
phenomena when there are minor specialists.20
Proposition 4: If the diagnosis cost d is positive, an equilibrium is either
an efficient, a specialization, or a fraud equilibrium.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of our results, which
we may compare to those in the closest set of papers. Wolinsky (1993)
assumes that f = 0; there then exists two regimes, as in our model. If the
diagnosis cost d is small there is specialization; if it is large equilibria are
efficient. Indeed, when f = 0 fraudulent recommendations are costless
and therefore involve no inefficiency.21 At the other end of the spectrum
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) consider the case where f = c¯ − c
¯
; as
in our model they find that equilibria are then efficient.
18. One may extend the model by allowing experts to mimic a minor repair when they
in fact proceed to a major one. The associated fraud cost f ′ would be defined as the cost
of hiding the use of inputs that are characteristic of a major repair. Then one could build
equilibria with fraud and overtreatment in which experts always claim that a minor repair
is needed. The associated inefficiency would be (1 − μ)f ′. Because in most cases f ′ is high
compared to f , such equilibria may only emerge when μ is high.
19. These results were derived under the assumption that the loss had to be fixed.
When the customer may replace the damaged good at a price r, similar results (with
minor changes in the threshold values) would hold if r ≥ c¯. By contrast, if r < c¯ only
the specialization equilibrium would be able to survive. However, the consumer would
replace the good without a diagnosis if the diagnosis cost were too large. By contrast to the
case where r ≥ c¯, the market would always perform efficiently, for the consumer would
resort to a diagnosis precisely in those cases where the diagnosis cost is sufficiently low
to make it worthwhile from a welfare point of view.
20. In the case d = 0, one may, moreover, build equilibria with diagnosis providers
who provide a truthful diagnosis free of charge.
21. The threshold value for d below which specialization occurs in our model, (c¯ − c
¯
)μ,
is smaller than the one obtained by Wolinsky, which is (c¯ − c
¯
)μ/(1 − μ). This difference
arises because Wolinsky does not allow for an endogenous diagnosis price, which implies
that in his model experts make strictly positive profits in the equilibrium where consumers
visit one single expert.
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FIGURE 1. EQUILIBRIA
4.1 Equilibrium Tariffs and Cross Subsidies
Equilibrium tariffs are typically not unique. For instance, if f = c¯ − c
¯marginal cost pricing (d, c
¯
, c¯) is an equilibrium tariff; but another equi-
librium tariff involves a free diagnosis: (0, c
¯
+ d, c¯ + d). The following
proposition describes equilibrium tariffs in a more systematic manner
(it is a direct consequence of Propositions 1, 2, and 3, and its proof
is therefore omitted). Although the parameter values for which the
different kinds of equilibria exist depend on Assumption 2—see further
Proposition 6 in Section 5.2—the qualitative features of equilibrium
tariffs as described in the following proposition do not.
Proposition 5: Marginal cost pricing, where the consumer pays d for
a diagnosis, c
¯
for a minor repair, and c¯ for a major repair, occurs only in
specialization equilibria (it may also occur in an efficient equilibrium if f = c¯ −
c
¯
). Otherwise, the diagnosis price may take any values in [0, d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f )],
each customer visits only one expert, and experts make positive profits on
customers with minor losses, and negative profits on customers with major
losses.
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Proposition 5 says that diagnosis prices may sometimes be set
below cost, and even at zero.22 It also shows that the largest possible
diagnosis price is increasing in the fraud cost f . Indeed the smaller is f ,
the larger is the profit made on a minor intervention, and the smaller
is the diagnosis price. This might explain why car and home repair
services typically go together with low diagnosis prices, whereas health
care providers in general charge significant amounts for a diagnosis: for
repair services consumers observe very few inputs, which suggests a
small fraud cost; with health care services it seems reasonable to assume
that the opposite is true.
Our model also explains why experts may resort to cross subsi-
dization among their services. Making repair prices closer sometimes
avoids fraud. When fraud cannot be avoided, customers always pay the
same repair price, and once again customers with minor losses subsi-
dize customers with major losses. Specialization emerges when these
cross-subsidies are not sustainable.
4.2 Welfare
Because demand is perfectly inelastic, welfare is measured by the
expected cost of getting the consumer’s loss fixed. This expected cost is
C for efficient equilibria, C + (1 − μ) d for specialization equilibria, and
C + μf for equilibria with fraud. Here we discuss how welfare is affected
by changes in the economies of scope parameter d, and by changes in
the fraud cost parameter f . Figure 1 provides visual aid for the following
remarks.
First, given the number of experts visited in an equilibrium,
welfare is decreasing in the diagnosis cost d. Second, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that welfare increases in a discontinuous manner when
equilibrium switches from the specialization regime to the fraud regime.
In the fraud regime welfare decreases less rapidly with the diagnosis
cost, because the consumer then visits only one expert in equilibrium.
Welfare again increases in a discontinuous manner when reaching the
efficient regime.23 This may be seen in Figure 2, where the values d∗ and
d∗∗ correspond to the critical values of d for which equilibria switch from
one kind to another.
22. Taylor (1995) finds that there exist equilibria with a zero diagnosis price; however,
only the diagnosis cum treatment price is uniquely determined, and the diagnosis price
may be as well set at diagnosis cost. In Emons (1997), the diagnosis cost is sunk once
an expert has entered the market; the zero diagnosis price that his model predicts under
certain circumstances thus amounts to marginal cost pricing.
23. The fact that welfare changes in a discrete manner is likely a result of the
discreteness of the model. Further research may seek to determine whether the same
is true for the nonmonotonicity of welfare which is exhibited here.
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FIGURE 2. WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF THE DIAGNOSIS COST d
Figure 3 shows welfare as a function of the fraud cost. For a given
diagnosis cost d welfare is maximized if the fraud cost f is sufficiently
large for an efficient equilibrium to exist, or if equilibrium involves
costless fraudulent recommendations ( f = 0). For values in between,
equilibria are inefficient, and welfare decreases in the fraud cost f
within the fraud regime. Interestingly, increasing the fraud cost so as
to eliminate fraud has a detrimental effect on welfare if specialization
arises instead.
Fraud in experts markets is generally viewed as a problem. Our
model suggests a more cautious evaluation: in our setup fraud is an
issue from a welfare point of view only if fraud is costly ( f > 0). If the
fraud cost is nil, an equilibrium involving fraudulent recommendations
is efficient. Receiving a truthful recommendation is not valuable per se;
equilibrium recommendation and visit strategies matter only for the
costs that they entail.
5. Discussion
In this section we clarify the role played by some of our assumptions,
and we discuss some extensions.
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FIGURE 3. WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF THE FRAUD COST f
5.1 No Repair Descriptions
Assumption 1 says that prior to using characteristic inputs in a major
repair an expert must inform the consumer. This assumption can also
be relaxed to better fit simpler repairs because then an expert would no
longer reveal whether he intends to use a characteristic input and repair
prices would no longer be conditional on whether or not characteristic
inputs are used, as they were above. As a result warranty contracts
would be feasible: an expert could sell a contract whereby he promises
to fix any loss at a specific price. Competition would drive the price of
such a contract to C.
Clearly such a contract is vulnerable to adverse selection.24 Indeed
a consumer may prefer to first visit a minor specialist, and in case his
loss is major he would then visit another expert proposing a warranty
contract. Such an opportunistic behavior can only be deterred if
24. Warranty contracts signed prior to a loss also suffers from the drawback of
linking the consumer to a particular expert, which may imply high transportation costs.
Admittedly, experts may form networks to mitigate this problem, but the analysis of such
networks would require a very different setup.
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d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)C > C,
or, equivalently,
d > μ(c¯ − c
¯
).
This is reminiscent of the analysis in Wolinsky (1993), where prices are
not conditional on any specific inputs to be used either. The market
outcome is efficient if the diagnosis cost is large, but otherwise special-
ization arises. This discussion highlights the main point of this paper,
which is that inefficient overtreatment arises if a major repair requires an
expert to inform the consumer that some observable inputs will be used.
Indeed, equilibrium overtreatment occurs precisely because it enables
an expert to avoid revealing information about the true loss.
5.2 The Role of Minor Specialists
In the above analysis efficient equilibria fail to exist when f < f ∗, because
the required mark-up above the minor repair cost cannot be sustained if
some experts offer minor repairs at cost. If the existence of minor special-
ists were not imposed by assumption, the conditions stated in Proposi-
tions 1–3 would still be sufficient for the respective equilibria to exist if
one allowed for inactive players: a minor specialist with a tariff (d, c
¯
, c
¯
)
makes zero profits in any case, and this tariff always represents a best
response by an expert. All the arguments used to prove Propositions 1–
3 thus remain valid. However, there would also exist other equilibria,
where no expert player offers a specialist tariff. In particular, it turns out
that there would exist equilibria without fraud for all parameter values.
The following is shown in the Appendix.
Proposition 6: If Assumption 2 is relaxed there exists an efficient equilib-
rium if and only if: f ≥ f ∗ or f ≤ f ∗∗.
For the parameter values for which only fraud equilibria exist
under Assumption 2, there now also exists an efficient equilibrium.
This equilibrium is described as follows. Suppose that all experts set
the same tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯). To deter fraud, the price for a minor repair must
be set high enough, and when f < f ∗ it must be set above c
¯
+ d. The most
relevant deviation is thus for one of the experts to offer a minor specialist
tariff. But this would lead the nondeviating experts to understand that
offering to do a minor treatment would lead to consumer defection.
Hence nondeviating experts would choose to defraud the customer by
always recommending a major treatment. When f < f ∗∗, the customer
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indeed prefers to visit a nondeviating expert and accept the (sometimes
fraudulent) offer, than to first visit the minor specialist. The deviation is
not profitable because it causes experts to change their recommendation
behavior.
In real experts markets, this type of equilibrium may be relevant
when experts are able to rapidly react to the opening of a “cheap”
repair store offering basic repairs at a low price; then the store would
attract no customers and ultimately close. The situation is different if a
minor specialist appears for another reason: some consumers may be
informed about their loss; do-it-yourself kits for minor repairs may be
available. This is the situation that our Assumption 2 depicts, and now
efficient equilibria disappear for a sufficiently small fraud cost. Overall,
competition by minor specialists may thus be an important force behind
fraudulent overtreatment in experts markets.
5.3 Mixed Strategies
In the above analysis we focused on pure strategy equilibria. Deriving
results in a setting where experts and consumers may use mixed
strategies happens to be quite difficult.25 The complexity arises from
the fact that an expert may deviate with a tariff which is followed by
a mixed recommendation strategy. We conjecture that fraud equilibria
should exist even when such deviations are possible. However, mixed
strategy equilibria without fraud may also exist. In particular, there may
exist equilibria in which experts are truthful because consumers reject
their recommendation of a major treatment with a probability large
enough to make fraud unprofitable.26 Such equilibria would be slightly
more efficient than specialization equilibria. However, as in an efficient
equilibrium cross subsidies between minor and major repairs would be
necessary, and therefore the threat of consumer defection would still be
relevant. Consider a situation where a small markup above cost for a
minor repair successfully prevents consumer defection. Then the expert
would have a strong incentive to defraud the consumer and recommend
a major repair, unless the consumer very likely rejected a major repair.
The fundamental trade-off between costly repeated advice and costly
overtreatment would again be at work. For values of f sufficiently
small relative to d the consumer should prefer to get a fraudulent
recommendation than having to incur the diagnosis cost d twice.
25. To the best of our knowledge only Pitchik and Schotter (1987) and Wolinsky (1993)
allow for mixed strategies in a model of a competitive experts market. However, they
impose exogenously given repair prices.
26. Fong (2005) exhibits a similar equilibrium in a monopolistic setting. We were able
to verify that in our setting these candidates are not equilibria for f < min{f ∗∗, f ∗}.
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6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a theory of fraud in experts markets
which is based on the strategic content of information: an expert may
want to lie to the customer in order to keep him uninformed, thereby
preventing him from seeking a better price elsewhere. Because the
customer is able to observe some of the inputs used, fraud comes at
the cost of using unnecessary inputs and is inefficient. This argument
applies to various industries, such as car repairs or health care, where
information is scarce and each visit to an expert is costly. The model we
have solved provides several additional insights.
First, fraud is problematic because it entails inefficient overtreat-
ment. We find that such overtreatment may arise in equilibrium, even
if the market is competitive. This finding is new in the literature,
and it may offer a sound and structural basis for applied research on
physician-induced demand. In particular, the argument given above
supports the so-called physician-induced demand hypothesis, which
states in a provocative manner that more competition could lead to more
overtreatment. As we have explained, this is due to the opportunism
of both experts and customers. Creating commitments through more
stringent contracts in which the customer would commit to accept
a repair may restore efficiency; in health care the rise of managed
health care centers may be explained along these lines. However, such
“warranty contracts” are likely to suffer from other important problems,
such as adverse selection, and the provision of incentives for the expert
to fix the loss once it arises. Further research should address these issues
in a systematic manner.
Second, the mere threat of fraud may create welfare costs, even
in the absence of equilibrium fraud, by requiring the customers to
seek a costly double advice. This is what happens in our model in
the specialization equilibrium. Furthermore, welfare may be lower in
this regime; eradicating equilibrium fraud may thus be a misleading
objective.
Third, our model may explain why diagnosis prices are often set
below diagnosis costs. As in most models with switching costs, by doing
so experts want to attract consumers in the first place; but another
important rationale is that this enables experts to transfer to customers
the profits originating from treatment prices being above marginal cost.
Our analysis suggests that such mark-ups may be pervasive in experts
markets, either as an instrument to deter fraud, or as a direct result of
fraud.
Finally, in our framework there is no intrinsic value in obtaining
accurate information from the expert. However, such information may
matter for third parties; in particular, the performance of insurance
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markets depends on whether insurance contracts may be contingent
on the true state or not. For this reason, and also because insurance is a
highly relevant aspect of many experts markets, it would be desirable
to extend our model to allow for insurance.
Appendix
In the proofs below we say that an expert is a first-visited expert if
with some positive probability he is chosen by a consumer for the first
visit. For any set of tariffs announced in the first stage of the game,
a continuation equilibrium is a PBE of the subgame following these
announcements. Let e
¯
(resp. e¯) denote the best total price for fixing a
minor (resp. major) loss in the considered continuation equilibrium.
Note that e
¯
≥ c
¯
and e¯ ≥ c¯, as experts can always choose to reject a
consumer after the diagnosis stage. We will use ε to refer to an arbitrarily
small positive number. Finally, we will use the tie-breaking rules spelled
out at the end of Section 2, without necessarily referring to them each
time.
We begin by proving a lemma that will be used in the proofs to the
propositions.
Lemma 1: Denote (p, p
¯
, p¯) the tariff of a first-visited expert in a continuation
equilibrium. Under Assumption 2 this expert is either
(a) a truthful expert who does not make any repair (and then d = 0)
(b) an expert who only repairs major losses (and then f = c¯ − c
¯
and p¯ = c¯)
(c) a truthful expert who repairs only minor losses and earns zero-profits
(d) a truthful expert who repairs all losses (and then f ≥ f ∗)
(e) an expert who always offers a major treatment and repairs all losses, for a
total price p + p¯ ∈ [C + μ f, d
μ
+ c
¯
] (and then f ≤ f ∗∗).
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose first that no losses are repaired at the cus-
tomer’s first visit. Then this visit would be useless unless the consumer
could deduce his true type from the expert’s offer after the diagnosis
stage. Moreover, by assumption we know that at the first visit the
customer would reject all the repair offers that the expert may make.
Therefore any consumer, at any stage of the continuation game, would
also reject the repair offers; this shows that the expert never repairs
any losses. To avoid making nonnegative profits, it must then be that
p ≥ d. After his first visit, the consumer is informed about his loss,
and he therefore ends up paying p + μe
¯
+ (1 − μ)e¯. By visiting a minor
specialist first, the consumer would have paid d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)e¯, so that
p + μe
¯
≤ d + μc
¯
. Because e
¯
≥ c
¯
and p ≥ d, this is only possible if p = d
and e
¯
= c
¯
. The latter equality implies that there exists an expert with a
tariff (0, c
¯
, p¯′), who accepts consumers and proposes c
¯
to consumers with
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minor losses. Because this expert accepts consumers, to avoid getting
negative profits he must expect to sometimes repair major losses through
an offer p¯′ that must be accepted, so that p¯′ ≤ e¯. But then the consumer
could visit this expert first, and pay μc
¯
+ (1 − μ) p¯′; as a result we must
have μc
¯
+ (1 − μ) p¯′ ≥ p + μe
¯
+ (1 − μ)e¯, which is possible only if p = 0.
Because we know that p ≥ d, we get d = 0, as announced in case a of the
lemma.
Second, suppose that only major losses are repaired at the cus-
tomer’s first visit (Assumption A). Then the expert must propose p¯
to major losses, and this offer is accepted by the customer at his first
visit. Moreover, p¯ must never be proposed to minor losses, because this
would be accepted by the customer at his first visit, thus contradicting
Assumption A. Assumption A also implies that either the expert rejects
minor losses, or his offer p
¯
is rejected by the customer at his first visit
(and would therefore also be rejected by any customer at any stage of
the continuation game). As a result the expert earns zero profits on the
treatment of minor losses. But by proposing p¯ to minor losses, the expert
could earn p¯ − c
¯
− f (because p¯ is accepted by the customer at his first
visit). It must therefore be that p¯ − c
¯
− f ≤ 0, but because p¯ ≥ c¯ and
f ≤ c¯ − c
¯
this implies that f = c¯ − c
¯
and p¯ = c¯, as announced in Case b
of the lemma.
Third, suppose that only minor losses are repaired at the cus-
tomer’s first visit (Assumption A’). Let us first show that the expert never
repairs major losses, for any customer at any stage of the continuation
game. This is clear if p¯ < c¯. If p¯ ≥ c¯ our tie-breaking rules imply that the
expert must propose p¯ to major losses. Under Assumption A’ p¯ must be
rejected by a customer at his first visit, so that the expert repairs minor
losses through the offer p
¯
. Therefore from an offer p¯ any consumer can
infer that his loss is major. As a result, if the offer p¯ is rejected by the
customer at his first visit, it would also be rejected by a customer who
is not at his first visit. We may conclude that the expert never repairs
major losses. Because under Assumption 2, the consumer can visit a
minor specialist first, our expert must make zero profits, as announced
in case c.
Fourth, suppose that all losses are repaired at the customer’s first
visit. If the expert is truthful, then it must be under Assumption 2 that
f ≥ f ∗, as we have argued in Section 3.1; so we get case d.
Finally, if the expert always recommends a major treatment, the
consumer ends up paying p + p¯. But under Assumption 2, the con-
sumer could have visited a minor specialist first, so that we must
have
p + p¯ ≤ d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)(p + p¯)
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or, equivalently, μ(p + p¯) ≤ d + μc
¯
. Moreover, p + p¯ ≥ C + μ f because
otherwise the expert would make negative profits.27 Together these
inequalities yield f ≤ f ∗∗, as announced in item e. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The condition f ≥ f ∗ was shown to be necessary
in the text. Conversely, let us show that if f ≥ f ∗ there exists an
efficient equilibrium in which all players offer the tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯) =
(d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ), c¯ − f, c¯). Note that the diagnosis price is positive,
and that the assumption f ∈ [0, c¯ − c
¯
] implies that p
¯
is above c
¯
. With
this tariff the expert has no incentive to make a false recommendation
given that the consumer accepts, and the consumer accepts both recom-
mendations because turning either of them down would only imply a
larger cost to get the loss fixed (indeed f ≥ f ∗ implies that p
¯
≤ c
¯
+ d).
The experts make zero expected profits, and the consumer’s expected
cost for getting the loss fixed is C. We now prove that the condition f ≥
f ∗ guarantees that there exists no profitable deviation in tariff.
Suppose that after a deviation (p′, p
¯
′, p¯′) a consumer visiting a
nondeviating expert would still accept the recommendation p
¯
= c¯ − f .
Consider the following strategies: the nondeviating experts still accept
consumers and are truthful, and the consumer visits a nondeviating
expert at his first visit, and accepts both recommendations. Note that
because nondeviating experts are truthful it is indeed rational for the
consumer to accept recommendation c¯, because anyway the best alter-
native offer e¯ is at least equal to c¯. And when the consumer accepts both
recommendations an expert does not lie (indeed p
¯
= p¯ − f ). Therefore,
these strategies form an equilibrium of the subgame in which the
consumer chooses to first visit a nondeviating expert; in this subgame
the consumer ends up paying C. For the consumer to choose a different
visit pattern he must end up paying less than C; but then the deviation
cannot be strictly profitable unless some experts get negative profits, a
contradiction with the fact that experts must play best responses in the
continuation equilibrium following the deviation.
Now suppose that the deviating expert offers to treat minor losses
for strictly less than c¯ − f . Because f ≥ f ∗, this implies that the deviating
expert would get negative profits on customers with minor losses. A
profitable deviation must therefore make profits on customers with
major losses, so that p + p¯ > c¯ + d . Because c¯ + d ≥ c¯ − f , the deviating
expert cannot make the same offer to minor and major losses. He must
27. Because experts do not randomize, at any stage of a continuation game consumers
are either uninformed (with beliefs μ) or informed of their loss type. Moreover, f ∈ [0, c¯ −
c
¯
implies that c
¯
+ d ≤ C + μ f ≤ c¯ + d. Therefore p + p¯ < C + μ f would imply that the
expert gets negative profits on both uninformed consumers and consumers knowing that
their loss is major. Moreover, under Assumption 2 the expert cannot make profits by
attracting consumers knowing they have a minor loss.
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therefore be truthful and propose p
¯
to minor losses and p¯ to major losses,
and both offers are accepted. But then
p¯ − p
¯
= (p + p¯) − (p + p
¯
) > (c¯ + d) − (c¯ − f ) = d + f ≥ f,
in contradiction with the deviating expert being truthful.
It only remains to be shown that in all efficient equilibria profits
must be zero. Consider such an efficient equilibrium, in which all players
set the same efficient tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯). Suppose that experts make positive
profits:
p − d + μ(p
¯
− c
¯
) + (1 − μ)( p¯ − c¯) > 0.
Because p¯ ≤ p
¯
+ f and p
¯
≤ c
¯
+ d (under Assumption 2) and f ≤ c¯ − c
¯
,
this implies that p > 0. Then any expert could deviate to (p − ε, p
¯
, p¯).
With such a tariff the recommendation of a minor treatment is accepted,
and the expert is truthful from our tie-breaking rules. Therefore the
recommendation of a major treatment is also accepted. Clearly, the
consumer prefers to visit this expert first. The deviating expert’s profits
would increase because he would attract the whole market instead of
only a share of it. 
Next we state and prove a lemma which will be used in the proofs
of Propositions 2–4.
Lemma 2: Consider an inefficient equilibrium E in which all experts set the
same tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯), with p¯ ≥ c¯ and p + p¯ > c¯. Under Assumption 2, for any
p1 ∈ [0, p + p¯ − c¯), we have
(i) If an expert (say, expert 1) deviates towards the tariff (p1, c¯ − f, c¯), then
in any continuation game following this deviation all major losses are
repaired by expert 1.
(ii) Through this deviation expert 1 gets a profit BM ≡ p1 − d on each
customer with a major loss who visits him.
(iii) If through this deviation expert 1 does not repair the minor loss of a
customer who visits him, then his profit on this customer is Bm = BM. In
any case Bm ≥ BM.
(iv) If he also repairs all minor losses, then total profits of expert 1 are p1 −
d + μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ).
Proof of Lemma 2. We proceed by contradiction and suppose that in
a continuation equilibrium following the deviation major losses are
repaired by nondeviating experts. Then it must be that the customer
visits a nondeviating expert at his first visit: indeed, if the customer knew
that his loss is major before such a visit, he would be strictly better off
visiting expert 1 instead, because by assumption expert 1 offers a strictly
lower price (p1 + c¯ < p + p¯) for fixing major losses.
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If the nondeviating expert repairs only major losses, we are neces-
sarily in case b of Lemma 1, so that f = c¯ − c
¯
and p¯ = c¯. Therefore, the
tariff of expert 1 is (p1, c¯
, c¯), and the assumption p1 + c¯ < p + p¯ reduces
to p1 < p. In addition, from our tie-breaking rules expert 1 is truthful. By
visiting a nondeviating expert first the customer pays p + μe
¯
+ (1 − μ) p¯;
by visiting expert 1 first he would pay p1 + μc¯ + (1 − μ)c¯, which isstrictly less because p1 < p and c¯ ≤ e¯, and we reach a contradiction.If the nondeviating expert repairs all losses through a major
treatment, then the consumer pays p + p¯ while by visiting expert 1 he
could have paid p1 + c¯, which is strictly lower by assumption.
Finally, the nondeviating expert may be truthful and repair all
losses, which would require p¯ − f ≤ p
¯
≤ c
¯
+ d. This implies that the
nondeviating experts were also truthful when playing the equilibrium
E in the absence of deviation, and all their recommendations were ac-
cepted. Because we have assumed that the equilibrium E was inefficient,
then it must be that under E the consumer preferred to visit a minor
specialist first, so that
d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)(p + p¯) ≤ p + μp
¯
+ (1 − μ) p¯.
But because p1 + c¯ < p + p¯ this implies that
d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)(p1 + c¯) < p + μp
¯
+ (1 − μ) p¯
so that the consumer strictly prefers to visit a minor specialist first,
to visiting a nondeviating expert first. But then nondeviating experts
cannot repair major losses, as explained at the beginning of this proof.
We have thereby proved item (i) in the lemma.
The expression for BM obtains directly. For minor losses, either the
deviating expert rejects them and gets Bm = BM; or, he repairs them and
gets BM + c¯ − c¯ − f ≥ BM. Items (iii) and (iv) follow. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that a specialization equilibrium
exists if f ∈ [ f ∗∗, f ∗). Consider the following candidate: at least two
experts (“minor specialists”) play the tariff (d, c
¯
, c
¯
); at least two experts
(“major specialists”) play the tariff (d, c
¯
, c¯); all experts play one of these
tariffs; consumers and experts behave as in Definition 2. One can easily
check that in the continuation game associated to these tariffs no player
can profitably deviate. Minor specialists reject major losses and are
truthful. Major specialists lie because their offer of a major treatment
is accepted, and because lying makes their profits increase (c¯ − f > c
¯from f < f ∗). Finally the consumer behaves as in Definition 2; indeed
one can verify that f ∗∗ < f ∗ implies that
d + c¯ > d + μc
¯
+ (1 − μ)(c¯ + d),
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so that visiting a major specialist first is dominated. It only remains to
be checked that no deviation in tariffs can be profitable. Note that after
a deviation nondeviating minor specialists can still propose to fix minor
losses for c
¯
+ d, while major specialists can still propose to fix major
losses for c¯ + d, without having to fear negative profits. Hence, to be
profitable the deviating expert must attract the customer when he is
uninformed, that is, at his first visit. We refer to Lemma 1 to establish
the following. Case a of Lemma 1 cannot be strictly profitable because
the deviating expert would have to charge p > d, and then the customer
would prefer to visit a minor specialist first. Case b is irrelevant because
f < f ∗ implies f < c¯ − c
¯
. Case c is associated with zero profits and cannot
be profitable. Case d contradicts f < f ∗. Finally Case e is feasible only if
f = f ∗∗ because f ≥ f ∗∗. But then the deviating expert’s profits are zero,
because by definition f ∗∗ is such that C + μ f = d
μ
+ c
¯
.
In the remainder of the proof, we establish necessary conditions
for the existence of specialization equilibria. Thus suppose that such
an equilibrium exists, and denote by (p0, p
¯0
, p¯0) and (p, p
¯
, p¯) the tariffs
played by minor and major specialists, respectively. We now show that
we can apply Lemma 2 to this equilibrium, if we moreover assum
d > 0.28 Indeed at equilibrium major specialists repair major losses (so
that p¯ ≥ c¯) and make nonnegative profits (so that p + p¯ ≥ c¯ + d > c¯
from d > 0). Moreover minor specialists do not fix major losses: they
either reject them ( p¯0 < c¯), or the consumer rejects their offer of a major
treatment ( p¯0 > p + p¯). When a major specialist deviates as in Lemma
2, the best offer for fixing major losses is reduced to p1 + c¯ < p + p¯; as
a result minor specialists still do not fix major losses. At best they fix
minor losses, and make zero profits under Assumption 2; but this is
exactly what the minor specialist postulated in Assumption 2 does. As a
result one can ignore these experts, and we can therefore apply Lemma
2 as if all players were major specialists with the same tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯).
We now show that profits are zero in a specialization equilibrium.
Note that under Assumption 2 minor specialists make zero profits.
Suppose that the major specialists’ total profits (1 − μ)(p + p¯ − c¯ − d) ≡
(1 − μ)B were positive. Consider a deviation (p1, c¯ − f, c¯) and choose
p1 = p + p¯ − c¯ − ε; this satisfies the assumptions in Lemma 2. Note that
BM = p1 − d = p + p¯ − c¯ − ε − d = B − ε, which is positive. Applying
items (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 2, we get that the profits of the deviating
expert (call him expert 1, as in the Lemma) are at least (1 − μ)BM =
(1 − μ)B − (1 − μ)ε. If expert 1 did not deviate he would have to share
28. The case d = 0 is omitted for brevity. It is clear that if d = 0 information can be
obtained at no cost, by visiting a minor specialist (as defined in Assumption 2) first and
rejecting all recommendations. The game then degenerates into a simple Bertrand game.
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(1 − μ)B with other major specialists, implying that the deviation is
profitable.
Next, we show that a specialization equilibrium cannot exist if
f ≥ f ∗. Suppose that it did exist. Let us apply Lemma 2 to the deviation
(p1 = d − μ(c¯ − c¯ − f ) + ε, c¯ − f, c¯). Because f ≥ f
∗ the recommendation
of a minor treatment is accepted. Therefore expert 1 is truthful, and
the recommendation of a major treatment is also accepted. Finally it
is easily verified that the consumer prefers to visit this efficient expert
first. Item (iv) then implies that the deviation is profitable, thus yielding
a contradiction.
We finally show that a specialization equilibrium cannot exist
if f < min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}. Let us apply Lemma 2 to the deviation (p1 = d −
μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ) + ε, c¯ − f, c¯). Because f < f ∗, the recommendation of a
minor treatment by expert 1 would be rejected; therefore, conditional
on being chosen by a consumer, expert 1 would always recommend a
major treatment. Moreover, Lemma 2 implies that expert 1 must repair
major losses. From the end of the proof of Lemma 1 we also know that
f < f ∗∗ is the condition ensuring that the consumer prefers to visit a
fraudulent expert first, rather than visiting him after having had minor
losses repaired by another expert. We can therefore conclude that expert
1 repairs all losses. Item (iv) in Lemma 2 then implies that the deviation
is profitable. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove that there exists a fraud equilibrium
if f ≤ f ∗∗ and f < f ∗. Suppose that all experts announce the tariff
(d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ), c
¯
, c¯), that they always claim that a major treatment
is needed, and that the customer accepts the recommendation of a
major treatment. Clearly, these strategies form a PBE of the continuation
subgame following the announcements of tariffs, because f ≤ f ∗∗ ensures
that the customer does not gain by visiting a minor specialist first. It
remains to be checked that there is no profitable deviation. Referring to
Lemma 1: Case a cannot be strictly profitable because the deviating
expert would have to charge p > d, and then the customer would
prefer to visit a minor specialist first; Case b is irrelevant because f < f ∗
implies f < c¯ − c
¯
; Case c is associated with zero profits and cannot be
profitable; Case d contradicts f < f ∗; and Case e cannot profitably attract
customers.
We now check that profits must be zero in a fraud equilibrium
when f ≤ f ∗∗ and f < f ∗. So suppose to the contrary that there exists
a fraud equilibrium in which all experts set a tariff (p, p
¯
, p¯) such that
p + p¯ > C + μ f . Recall from Lemma 1 that p + p¯ ∈ [C + μ f, d
μ
+ c
¯
]. If
f ∗∗ =0, then C + μ f = d/μ + c
¯
= c¯, which yields a contradiction because
then p + p¯ = C + μ f . If f ∗∗ > 0, we have C + μ f > c¯; but then we can
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once more apply Lemma 2 to p1 = p + p¯ − c¯ − ε. Because f < f ∗, the con-
sumer would reject the recommendation of a minor treatment; expert 1
therefore always recommends a major treatment and the consumer
accepts. Moreover, from item (i) in Lemma 2 expert 1 must repair major
losses. Hence, and given Assumption 2, all other experts can at best
repair minor losses for a price equal to d + c
¯
. Recall that f < f ∗∗ is the
condition ensuring that the consumer prefers to visit a fraudulent expert
first, rather than visiting him after having made minor losses repaired
by another expert. Therefore the customer prefers visiting expert 1
first, and expert 1 repairs all losses. Item (iv) then applies; the profit
of expert 1 is p1 − d + μ(c¯ − c¯ − f ) = [p + p¯ − (C + μ f )] − ε, which isto be compared to a share of the total profits [p + p¯ − (C + μ f )]. As a
result the deviation is profitable.
Finally, we prove that there exists no fraud equilibrium if f > f ∗∗,
or if f ≥ f ∗. First, if a fraud equilibrium exists then Case e in Lemma 1
implies that f ≤ f ∗∗. Now consider the case f ≥ f ∗. Then one can apply
Lemma 2 to p1 = d − μ(c¯ − c¯ − f ) + ε. Our tie-breaking rules wouldimply that the deviating expert is truthful. The deviation would attract
consumers at their first visit, and the deviation would therefore be
profitable. 
Proof of Proposition 4. From Lemma 1, it only remains to be shown that
Case b cannot be part of an equilibrium. In Case b the consumer visits
an expert with a tariff (p, p¯, c¯) (so that p ≥ d to avoid negative profits)
who repairs only major losses. If the consumer is rejected he visits a
minor specialist, who under Assumption 2 must make zero profits.
Because f = c¯ − c
¯
, we can apply Lemma 2 to p1 = d − μ(c¯ − c¯ − f ) + ε.Once more expert 1 is truthful from our tie-breaking rules, he attracts
consumers at their first visit because he is efficient, and thus increases
his profits. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us consider a candidate efficient equilibrium
without any minor specialists. Suppose that all experts set the tariff
(d − μ(c¯ − c
¯
− f ), c¯ − f, c¯) and behave truthfully, so that the consumer
ends up paying the efficient amount C. In the case f ≥ f ∗, we can proceed
exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1: a deviation can be profitable
only if it proposes to fix minor losses for less than c¯ − f , but then the
expert cannot be truthful and the deviation would not be profitable.
Assume now that f < f ∗. Then experts offer the minor treatment at
a price p¯ > c
¯
+ d. Consider an expert who deviates towards a minor
specialist tariff (d + ε, c
¯
, c
¯
). Then a nondeviating expert would anticipate
that his offer of a minor treatment would be rejected by the customer.
So, if a nondeviating expert still accepts customers, then he must always
recommend the major treatment. But then nondeviating experts are in
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effect using the tariff of the most efficient fraud equilibrium (see the
beginning of the proof to Proposition 3). If f > f ∗∗, the customer prefers
to first visit the minor specialist, so that the nondeviating experts would
attract only major losses. Whether or not the nondeviating experts
accept consumers at all, the deviation would be profitable by fixing
the customers’ minor losses. By contrast, if f ≤ f ∗∗ the consumer would
prefer to first visit a nondeviating expert, even though this would imply
an additional expected cost of μf . In this case, the deviation is not
profitable. 
References
Darby, M. and E. Karni, 1973, “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 67–88.
De Jaegher, K. and M. Jegers, 2001, “The Physician-Patient Relationship as a Game of
Strategic Information Transmission,” Health Economics, 10, 651–668.
Diamond, P.A., 1971, “A Model of Price Adjustment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 156–
168.
Dranove, D., 1988, “Demand Inducement and the Physician/Patient Relationship,” Eco-
nomic Inquiry, 26, 281–298.
Dulleck, U. and R. Kerschbamer, 2006, “On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists:
The Economics of Credence Goods,” Journal of Economic Literature, 44, 5–42.
Emons, W., 1997, “Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts,” RAND Journal of Economics,
2, 107–119.
——, 2001, “Credence Goods Monopolists,” International Journal of Industrial Organization,
19, 375–389.
Farley, P.J., 1986, “Theories of the Price and Quantity of Physician Services: A Synthesis
and Critique,” Journal of Health Economics, 5, 315–333.
Fong, Y.-F., 2005, “When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target?” RAND Journal of
Economics, 36, 113–130.
Lal, R. and C. Matutes, 1994, “Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies,” Journal of Business,
67, 345–370.
McGuire, T.G., 2000, “Physician Agency,” in A.J. Culyer, and J.P. Newhouse, eds., Handbook
of Health Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
Pesendorfer, W. and A. Wolinsky, 2003, “Second Opinions and Price Competition: Ineffi-
ciency in the Market for Expert Advice,” Review of Economic Studies, 70, 417–437.
Pitchik, C. and A. Schotter, 1987, “Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information,” American
Economic Review, 77, 1032–1036.
Taylor, C.R., 1995, “The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures,” Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 53–74.
Tirole, J., 1988, A Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wolinsky, A., 1993, “Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 24, 380–398.
